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ABSTRACT
The use of secure connections using HTTPS as the default
means, or even the only means, to connect to web servers
is increasing. It is being pushed from both sides: from the
bottom up by client distributions and plugins, and from the
top down by organisations such as Google. However, there
are potential technical hurdles that might lock some clients
out of the modern web. This paper seeks to measure and pre-
cisely quantify those hurdles in the wild. More than three
million measurements provide statistically significant evi-
dence of degradation. We show this through a variety of
statistical techniques. Various factors are shown to influence
the problem, ranging from the client’s browser, to the locale
from which they connect.
1. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing push for “HTTPS Everywhere,” a
self-explanatory term for the ubiquitous use of HTTPS
in preference to HTTP for all services, not only those
specifically requiring a secure connection. The Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is promulgating a
browser extension to this effect [1] as a defence against
spying, e.g., from nation states in the post-Snowden era.
Google supports the idea [2], and has announced that
they will give search-rank priority to HTTPS sites [3].
And the increase in the number of clients accessing
the Internet through wireless connections mandates en-
cryption at the connection level. Reactions include the
HTTPS-Only Standard [4], for the US Federal-Government.
HTTPS, or more exactly HTTP over TLS (Transport
Layer Security) is a secure form of the standard Hyper-
Text Transfer Protocol. It is secure in that it provides
1. server authentication using certificates, i.e., a server
can prove its identity;
2. a private communications channel, i.e., it prevents
eavesdropping; and
3. data integrity, i.e., it prevents standard man-in-the-
middle attacks.
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HTTPS everywhere therefore appears beneficial.
There is a performance cost, however, documented
[5–7] as far back as the 1990s. This cost arises primarily
because the certificate exchange requires an additional
round trip at the start of a connection. However, most
HTTP requests don’t require a full handshake, and with
modern hardware the cryptography overhead is not crit-
ical. For example Doug Beaver from Facebook, stated
“We have deployed TLS at a large scale using both
hardware and software load balancers. We have found
that modern software-based TLS implementations run-
ning on commodity CPUs are fast enough to handle
heavy HTTPS traffic load without needing to resort to
dedicated cryptographic hardware. We serve all of our
[Facebook’s] HTTPS traffic using software running on
commodity hardware.” [8].
So on the face of it, HTTPS Everywhere is a “no
brainer.” There is even an “HTTP Shaming” web page.
“HTTPS Everywhere” seems to be happening. Stat-
Operator [9] reported that the number of (the top mil-
lion) sites using HTTPS as the default increased from
around 103 to 116 thousand from July to September,
2016. Google reports client usage statistics (via Chrome)
[10], and they show similar steady growth from 2015 to
the present. Naylor et al. [7] reported that in 2014,
HTTPS accounted for 50% of such connections.
However, there is an important question to answer
before we convert the entire Internet to HTTPS: Will
there be people who are stranded behind port 80?
We know that HTTPS is not an issue for many people
(the current large-scale deployments of HTTPS prove
that it mostly works), but there could be locations, or
users of specific equipment that face challenges. De-
tailed reasons are given in Section 2. They range from
concern about the quality of the technology, to the re-
jection of compromised connections.
In this paper, we provide evidence which will inform
a technical and policy debate about the deployment of
secure web services in the global Internet, by measuring
whether users can access HTTPS in the wild. We find
that there is sufficient evidence to show that HTTPS is
not universally easily accessible.
A secondary concern of this paper is the statistical
1
rigor necessary to allow such a statement to be made
with confidence. The proportion of users that failed to
make an HTTPS connection in our study was small. It
has been common in the past to simply report numbers,
and to make bold statements unsupported by statistical
methodology confirming the conclusions. Here, we seek
to present a case study describing a standard (albeit of-
ten ignored) statistical methodology for rigorously ana-
lyzing a set of measurements to enable statistically con-
fident statements to be made about the results, despite
a noisy and faint signal. The ability to detect such faint
signals is important — a mere 1% of users now repre-
sents hundreds of millions of individuals.
Another advantage of this approach is that we can
ask more sophisticated questions. Google reports [10]
differences in the proportions of HTTPS access by de-
vice type and by region for instance (with Japan no-
tably lagging). The question is then, is this difference
significant, or simply “noise”? That is, can the results
be explained simply by natural statistical variation in
the sample, or are they real? We show here that the
differences are real.
Between 10 November and 4 December 2016, we col-
lected 3.3 million observations using APNIC’s web ad-
vertising infrastructure [11], which is similar in concept
to other cross-origin request measurements, e.g., [12,13].
However, this measurement is different in two critical
respects. First, it uses Google’s advertisement infras-
tructure to redirect requests from a broader selection
of end-users than might be obtained by placing scripts
in a limited number of servers1. Second, the redirected
requests are innocuous. Hence, in this context, some
of the potentially vexing ethical considerations of such
measurements are not at issue. The users are not redi-
rected to contentious third parties, and thus our exper-
iments appear to the user like any other advertisement
to which users are subjected every day, and which users
can refuse to accept using common browser plugins (a
more detailed ethical discussion is included below).
We found statistically significant evidence that, in our
sample, there are clients that find HTTPS connections
harder to complete than HTTP, and that this difficulty
was influenced (in order of importance) by origin Au-
tonomous System, browser, country of origin, and op-
erating system. The variety of effects on the results
suggests that HTTPS problems are caused by a range
of problems, some of which are discussed in Section 2.
Regarding the nature of the tests, and the rigorous
statistical analysis, we use two key ideas. First, the tests
are constructed with a control measurement, such that
we can assess the natural level of noise, and understand
which connection failures might be statistical variation,
and which real.
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Though the existence of widespread country-wide censoring will limit
our visibility into certain domains.
Second, we apply a series on increasingly sophisti-
cated statistical techniques to investigate the data. No-
tably, we apply a technique calledRasch modeling, which
is used in assessing examinations and other similar tasks,
but whose use appears novel in the context of problems
such as Internet measurements. It is a tool that should
be more widely considered in the domain of analyzing
Internet measurements, but which required some degree
of customization to our types of problems. The set of
tools applied illustrates the nature of a statistical in-
vestigation, i.e., it is not a matter of blindly applying
a test, but rather a process of investigation and refine-
ment.
Finally, our anonymized dataset will be made public.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
2.1 Experimental Context
Simple web services with no protection against snoop-
ing or identity are typically conducted over TCP port
80, using the HTTP protocol. We call this ‘port 80’
service or HTTP.
Web services which are protected by Transport Layer
Security (TLS) are usually conducted over TCP port
443, commonly called ‘port 443’ or HTTPS.
There have been many studies of HTTPS. However,
they have focused on two main topics:
1. the certificate landscape, e.g., see [14–16], in which
the problems with certificate distribution have led
to security holes, and consequent fixes2; and
2. comparisons between HTTP and HTTPS perfor-
mance, looking primarily at their latency difference,
e.g., see [5, 6], but also considering communications
overhead and energy consumption [7].
As a consequence of using HTTPS, an additional
handshake is needed to establish a connection. There
can be no effective proxy-caching of the content, and fil-
tering (e.g., by firewalls) is hampered. HTTPS also uses
cryptography which induces extra computational (and
hence energy) costs, which may be trivial on a modern
computer, but may be important on battery-operated
devices, such as mobile phones.
Additionally, a deeper consequence of the additional
layer of complexity in the operation of a simple request
is the potential for problems. Surprisingly, studies of
HTTPS appear to assume basic reachability, or more
correctly, they appear to assume that HTTPS reacha-
bility, while perhaps not perfect, will be no worse than
HTTP. However, it is not obvious that this will be so.
A prominent browser maker asked if the Asia-Pacific
Network Information Centre (APNIC) Labs ad-based
measurement system [11] could see if a statistically sig-
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TLS security is predicated on valid certificates, and there have been
significant problems resulting from this weakness in the past. How-
ever, Certificate Transparency solves many of these issues [15].
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nificant number of users were unable to access TLS pro-
tected web resources.
So, what are the possible concerns? They range widely;
the following is an incomplete list.
1. A browser or OS may be too old to perform TLS at
the current specification. The webserver used in this
experiment did not offer older approaches, such as
RC4 cryptography, so there is a chance that pre-TLS
1.x browsers could not complete protocol binding.
However, the older standards are no longer consid-
ered secure, and it is our view that providing a false
appearance of security is worse than providing none.
It might be tempting to tell users to “catch up”, but
this is a problem on mobile phone networks who sell
captive locked phones left behind on “old cold” and
deprecated protocol variants.
2. Some modern browsers use intermediate systems to
speed up or cache data. Opera, for instance, de-
ployed a worldwide “anycast” cloud of intermediates
to offer speed-up services, performing tasks such as
JPG compression, to make the web faster. It is pos-
sible that this service notionally works with TLS,
but that it works badly for flows it has in port 80
that move up into TLS because the state doesn’t ex-
ist. Other well-meaning intermediary systems might
break such up-lifts.
3. The additional overhead of the extra handshake makes
the session more vulnerable to network problems,
and hence less stable.
4. TLS protects against the threat of bad actor man-in-
the-middle attacks. If an on-path attacker intercepts
the session and attempts to hijack an aspect of the
content, TLS will (and should) prevent the flawed
connection. However, if such attacks are prevalent,
they become DoS attacks on the HTTPS service.
5. A firewall along the path might block encrypted traf-
fic as a matter of course. Though most firewalls al-
low port 80 traffic, they sometimes block all other
ports. This might be considered misconfiguration,
but misconfiguration is not uncommon [17, 18].
6. Flaws in implementations are possible, but configu-
ration errors are more common [19].
Our approach uses a cross-site reference within an
advertisement in order to create a measurement. The
underlying idea is not new. It has been used to measure
DNSSEC and IPv6 deployment, among other issues,
e.g., [12] (or for a more general review see [13]). How-
ever, our approach differs in several respects from [13].
The most important is that it performs a pair of mea-
surements: a control based on HTTP, and the actual
measurement on HTTPS, the focus. As far as we are
aware, past studies have performed only the measure-
ment of interest, and therefore have been hard to inter-
pret statistically.
However, APNIC’s measurement infrastructure also
differs from other approaches in that we use (paid) web-
advertising to instantiate the tests (details described
below). Additionally, all fetches are to an APNIC-
managed server, avoiding the major ethical controver-
sies of past experiments.
2.2 Statistical Background
Here we lay out the key statistical background for the
work to follow, for readers who are not staticians.
We start by defining basic terminology:
Observation: the collected responses of a single client’s
connection attempts.
Measurement: a particular feature of an observation, for
instance, whether a successful HTTPS GET was com-
pleted. We also call these response variables, and de-
note them by random variables (RV) Y (j), where j ∈
{HTTP,HTTPS} is the measurement, and
Y (j) =
{
1, if measurement j succeeds,
0, otherwise.
Observations are collected instances {y
(j)
i }j of this RV.
Test: a statistical test applied to the data.
Group: a subset of the observations, divided by covari-
ates, e.g., by region, country, OS, browser, or ASN.
Categorical variable: a variable which takes a set of dis-
crete labelled values. In our case, we have nominal cat-
egorical variables, i.e., they are unordered. An example
here is the type of browser being used (e.g., Firefox v
Chrome).
Predictor: a variable, also called a covariate, whose
value may influence the outcome of the measurements.
Examples here include the country and Autonomous
System (AS) of origin of the IP address.
The most important distinction here is between a
measurement, and a statistical test.
Statistics has many tools, some aimed at data explo-
ration or visualization. However, one of the important
ideas is the hypothesis test. We start with a well-posed
pair of complementary hypotheses: H0 and H1, with
the former called the null-hypothesis. The statistical
test will either
1. reject the null-hypothesis, and thus substantiate the
alternative H1 with some degree of significance; or
2. fail to reject H0, which is not the same as saying H0
is true.
In a single test there are two types of error:
Type I: We reject H0 incorrectly, i.e., when H0 is true.
Type II: We fail to reject H0 when it is false.
Any such test will be conducted with respect to a
significance level, α, chosen at the outset of the exper-
iment. Here we use the commonly choice of α = 0.05.
This sets the Type I error probability.
The procedure for the test is to calculate a test statis-
tic, determine from this a p-value, and then reject the
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null-hypothesis if the p-value falls below the threshold
α. The common interpretation of the p-value is that
it is the probability, given the null-hypothesis is true,
of observing the given test statistic, or a more extreme
value. Hence, a small p-value can be taken as evidence
that the null-hypothesis is invalid. However, we must
be careful of this interpretation, because of the under-
lying statistical nature of the problem. Over a set of
repeated experiments, even were the null-hypothesis to
be true, we would expect to see a uniform distribution
of p-values, including some values < α (Type I errors).
Given we reject the null, we can say we have statisti-
cally significant evidence for the alternative hypothesis,
at the prescribed level of significance.
However, if we fail to reject the null, then wemust not
say the null is true, as there are two possibilities: that
the null is true, or that we simply lack enough evidence
to show that it is false. To say the null is true would be
to fall into the fallacy of ignorance, i.e., the fallacy that
states “because we have no evidence against H, then H
must be true.”
The Type I error probability is controlled by the pa-
rameter α. The Type II errors occur with a proba-
bility whose complement is called the power of the test,
and whose value depends on the number of observations
available, and on the data values themselves. Thus we
cannot control for it, but can ensure it is small by pro-
viding enough observations.
This discussion applies to a single hypothesis test, for
which we consider Per-comparison error rates (PCER).
However, as noted above, if we perform multiple com-
parisons, we should expect some Type I errors. Given
a particular significance level, e.g., α = 0.05, then we
expect approximately n × 0.05 such errors, and thus
we may draw the incorrect inference that a particular
test is significant. The overall probability of having at
least one Type I error in the family of tests is gener-
ally called the Family-wise error rate (FWER), and in
multiple comparison tests, it is this probability that we
set. To do so, we must make a correction. A common
approach is the Bonferroni correction [20], in which α is
divided by the number of tests in the family. We should
note that this is rather conservative, and that there are
other more complex procedures available [20], but our
first goal here is to move from a PCER, to a FWER.
A key assumption underlying this simple approach is
that each test is independent of the others. A discus-
sion of how this relates to our measurements will follow,
although there are more advanced procedures to attack
dependent results, e.g., [21].
The advantage of a hypothesis test over visualization,
or ad hoc conclusions, is that it is a consistent, repeat-
able test, with strict, precisely defined assumptions and
interpretation. Through its use we can avoid making
common errors, such as over-interpreting limited evi-
dence, or accepting logical fallacies.
There are also many criticisms of hypothesis testing.
The most important is, perhaps, that the value of a hy-
pothesis test is entirely dependent on the two hypothe-
ses chosen. There are two tests that we shall consider
here. The first considers whether two measurements are
independent. The null-hypothesis therefore is that two
random variables are independent, and the alternative
hypothesis is that they have some dependence.
We will not derive the standard test statistics, and
procedure for calculating their p-values here. We simply
note that there are standard approximations that lead
to a test within the class of χ2 tests (see the Pearson and
Spearman tests [22]), but that this test is simple enough
that an exact formulation can be derived, resulting in
the Fisher exact test [22] for independence. In our case,
we will test that (Y HTTP , Y HTTPS) are independent
random variables. This is such a basic test that most
statistical packages contain a function for computing it.
The main limitation (leading to approximations) in the
past was computational cost, but this did not apply in
our experiment so we used the exact test.
We will discuss the interpretation of such results in
our specific context below, but one important limitation
is that the measurements may be conditionally inde-
pendent, i.e., they may appear dependent, but actually
they are only so because of an underlying dependence
on some latent or hidden variable. We will discuss this
issue in more detail below, by considering the obvious
candidates for such a latent variable.
However, our experiment is a matched pairs experi-
ment. That is, the pair of measurements is conducted
on the same client. Thus we should expect to see de-
pendencies in the pair. The Fisher test is only a confir-
mation of what we expect.
The real question of interest is whether some users
have more trouble with HTTPS than HTTP. This can-
not be answered simply by comparing the proportions
of successes for each measurement, because these are
matched pair experiments, and therefore very likely cor-
related. Simply plotting the two probabilities, even with
confidence intervals, would not take these correlations
into account.
However, the inclusion of our control experiment makes
it possible to ask this question in the formal context of
hypothesis testing, using McNemar’s test [22], another
standard component in the statistical toolbox. In this
case, the null- and alternative hypotheses are:
• H0 is that p1 = p2; and
• H1 is that p1 6= p2;
where pj is the probability that the jth measurement
of any particular observation is successfully completed.
Rejecting the null implies significant evidence that the
difficulty of the two measurements is different.
One criticism of hypothesis testing not discussed above
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is that it is inadequate in itself. It can tell us “if” but
not “how much?” There are many procedures and tools
for taking the next step. These will be explored here,
but since their use goes beyond simple text-book appli-
cations, discussion is deferred until Section 4.
3. EXPERIMENTALMETHOD
3.1 Measurements
APNIC Labs uses web advertising to measure browser
behavior worldwide [11]. The advertisement is written
in HTML5 and fetches multiple pixels in the various pro-
tocol exchanges under test (DNS, TCP/UDP, IP, TLS).
The system is 100 lines of JavaScript, gzip compressed
to 5kb of data, which is a small cost in web-page loading.
A primer query in each advertisement served causes
the user’s browser to request a set of experiments with
a unique client identity (ID).
The primer query is an HTTP GET, and the body
of the response is a set of measurements to be per-
formed. Each measurement is a discrete URL with the
unique identity encoded, and is fetched under a ten-
second timeout via asynchronous JavaScript web fetch;
on completion of a measurement, the time is recorded.
On completion of all measurements, or the ten-second
timer, a result web query is sent, which encodes the mea-
surement results in the query argument as a sequence
of labels, showing the time or ‘null’ if they did not com-
plete inside the time limit.
The web logs show whether a primer/result pair was
valid, and if so, we analyze the results. Observations
without primer and result success are filtered from the
sample, although they can be useful for later debugging
and analysis.
The primary goal of these measurements was to col-
lect information about user web sessions and their abil-
ity to perform HTTPS. To do so, the experiment tested
whether a connection initiated on HTTP could be taken
to a TLS-protected session (HTTPS, port 443). Google
requires that advertisements placed over a TLS-secured
session remain in TLS. Thus we could not recruit TLS
users into a test of insecure web access. However, we
were permitted to take an unprotected port-80 HTTP
session and include fetches of web elements over TLS on
port 443. Therefore, we could construct a measurement
where the port 80 users were asked to fetch one web
asset over TLS thus detecting their ability or inability
to upgrade to TLS.
The data were collected between the 10th of Novem-
ber and 4th of December, 2016. Table 1 shows the total
set of client IDs, and the number of valid responses. A
large number of connection attempts defaulted to initi-
ating over HTTPS. Table 1 shows the decrease in the
number of experiments as we progress through HTTPS
to only HTTP. The latter is a small minority, but it is
these that we focus on, for reasons discussed below.
Table 1: Experiment duration, and number of observations.
Analysis focuses on the 3.3 million experiments initiated with
HTTP (with a subsequent HTTPS GET).
Duration
(days)
Unique
client IDs
(mil.)
Valid
responses
(mil.)
HTTPS
init.
(mil.)
HTTP
init.
(mil.)
25 192.5 132.4 129.1 3.3
We focused on connections initiated over HTTP be-
cause this HTTP signal provides a “control.” The prim-
ing process and the HTTP control measurement follow
an identical connection path. Hence, if the observation
is valid, the client has demonstrated the ability to per-
form an HTTP GET; therefore failures of subsequent
HTTP GETs provide an indication of the “noise” in
the system, i.e., the baseline rate of random loss against
which we should measure HTTPS connection failures.
Initial simple statistical analysis strongly suggested
that a weak signal existed, but at an intensity which
could not be easily measured. The situation is analo-
gous to experiments conducted on mice who are genet-
ically modified to have cancer. We wished to measure
factors that affected a situation which had a small prob-
ability (cancer, in the analogy, or HTTPS connection
failures in our case), and so we “artificially inflated” the
probability of seeing the phenomena of interest. In our
case, we focused on observations where the initial con-
nection was HTTP, because these were the cases where
failures of HTTPS were most often expected to occur.
As noted, it is a standard statistical approach to col-
lect data in this way, but we must note that the obser-
vation is not representative of a “typical” Internet user.
For instance, were we to measure a failure rate of 1% on
these observations, this does not mean that the general
population has a 1% failure rate. However, the ques-
tions of interest us here are not the absolute value of
the failure rate, but whether HTTPS is “harder” than
HTTP, and what factors affect the failure rate.
More formally, the main goal was to measure suc-
cess/failure for sessions upgrading to TLS and to see
if those sessions which could not upgrade to TLS were
still successful on port 80. In other words: “are there
stranded users?” and “what factors affect the likelihood
of being stranded?”
Google’s infrastructure should have reduced dupli-
cates, but we also removed obvious duplicates from the
data. There is some complexity in this process, result-
ing from apparent fetches from the same IP address,
which cannot be resolved, due to the potential presence
of middle-boxes such as Network Address Translators
(NATs). We preserved entirely unique requests for the
primer, but removed additional fetches without a new
primer. As a result, and because of DHCP reallocating
IP addresses over the timespan of the measurements, we
cannot claim that there are no duplicated observations,
but they should be minimal.
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3.2 Data Collected
The experiment logged all of the web fetches, using
domain names directed to APNIC-managed DNS and
web servers. We also captured the packet flow to rele-
vant services: port 80, port 443, ICMP, DNS, as well as
any fragmented IP state.
The combination of web logs, DNS logs, and packet
captures allowed us to collate experiments by their IP
address and identity in the DNS name, and as presented
to the web. Thus we were able to derive the exact se-
quences of events in any observation.
In the case of this experiment, the data was processed
into the form of a series of flags indicating (1) the suc-
cess or failure of each stage, and (2) whether the mea-
surement succeeded within a timeout. The delays were
recorded in each case up to 120 seconds, but for our pur-
poses we recorded success if the measurement completed
within a timeout of 10 seconds.
Only those users who issued a priming query in the
same calendar day as they sent a result were consid-
ered. This limited the exposure to repeated fetches,
and excluded users who had a strong signal of failure
to perform basic fetches (neither the primer nor result
had any specific qualities which made them candidates
to fail fetch).
In the data analyzed, unique client IDs were assigned
to anonymize the data. We used code which harvests
system entropy and time, to obtain probably unique
(modulo birthday paradox) non-sorted 96-bit numbers.
We then mapped them into hex (see [23], for the code
that was embedded in the NGINX [24] webserver).
3.3 Classification of Covariates
The secondary goal here was to identify the qualities
behind the quantities: i.e., can we understand these
users in terms of browser type, ISP, economy, or operat-
ing system, in order to identify specific problem causes?
In practice, this is important because the goal behind
APNIC’s participation in such experiments goes beyond
simply finding problems. Ideally, the experiment should
also help develop strategies to re-mediate any problems
found.
For the purposes of the analysis, a set of qualities were
identified, which we felt were simple, easy to reproduce
by other people, and classified the users into different
groupings for analysis, to try to understand which (if
any) qualified the problem. These qualities were:
• country,
• region (based on United Nations sub-regions [25]),
• origin Autonomous System Number (ASN),
• browser, and
• Operating System (OS).
We used the daily BGP table collected at AS4608 to
map IP addresses to Origin-ASN. There are well-known
problems in such a mapping. However, those problems
are most prevalent in infrastructure addresses, and we
measured “eye-balls” here. That is, the IP addresses we
saw were associated with end users, for which the AS
mapping tools are a reasonable approximation [26].
Likewise, mapping of eye-balls to geographic locations
is more accurate [26] than mapping arbitrary IP ad-
dresses to geographic locations. In this paper, we used
MaxMind [27] data to geolocate the IP addresses, but
only at the country/region levels, and so expected a rea-
sonably low error rate.
We also logged each client’s user-agent string, which
provides details of the client’s browser, OS, and device.
To collect and parse the information we used the Python
uabrowser library [28]. It is known that the user-agent
string is spoofed in some cases, for instance the ToR
browser bundle does so by default (e.g., it pretends to be
running on Windows, regardless of the underlying OS).
However, there is no easy way to avoid this problem at
present, and it remains a caveat on the browser- and
OS-level results.
We also considered categorizing the client’s device-
type, but this was too noisy to be useful at this stage,
due to the large number of uniquely identified device
types by vendor and version-string.
For each of these categories, we collated them into a
series of unique values, and then used a one-way random
relabeling to anonymize the categories. There might
be enough data to perform some act of deanonymiza-
tion, to obtain values for some categories, However,
it is important to note that this level of blinding was
not intended for the protection of individual privacy
(already protected through the client ID anonymiza-
tion, and unlikely to be compromised by the additional
coarse-grained categorisations). Rather it was intended
to allow the statistical analysis to proceed, unbiased by
preconceived notions of the likely results.
3.4 Ethical Concerns
Since Google’s advertising infrastructure was used, we
reviewed compliance with Google and APNIC lawyers,
and complied with Google’s legal restrictions on the
measurements. In particular, this excluded use of Per-
sonally Identifying Information (PII), which in any case
we did not require or want. End-user IP addresses were
only used for AS and regional classification, and were
then anonymized via a one-way-mapping.
The nature of the measurement technique precluded
voluntary recruitment, as in many other Internet mea-
surements. However, we strictly followed any suggestion
that the users wished to opt out of such studies. For in-
stance, end users who had enabled ‘do not track’, who
had disabled JavaScript, or who ran ad-blocking soft-
ware were not recruited. These measurements were also
less contentious than others that have applied similar
cross-origin requests e.g., [13]. Evidence suggests that
the rate of TLS in the public web is high (above 50% [7])
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Table 2: Statistical tests applied to the whole dataset. Note that
very small p-values are reported via a bound.
Test p-value Accept/Reject
Fisher < 2× 10−16 Reject null
McNemar < 2× 10−16 Reject null
and very likely significantly higher given the age of that
study, and that it has been rapidly increasing in recent
years [9, 10]. Therefore, the simple presence of a re-
quest to fetch a web asset over TLS does not represent
a high-risk activity.
We acknowledge that there is potential for users to hit
firewall or access control list limits, as a result of this ex-
periment, or register in economies which apply strong
border checks on the protocol of use. However, TLS
is used ubiquitously for banking, login, end-user track-
ing by less responsible advertisers, “bread crumbs” and
web-site logistics, and the measurement site to which
the advertisement redirected requests is innocuous, be-
longing to a regional address registry (APNIC), so we
were not able to discern any reasonable risk to partici-
pants from such a connection.
Each user was requested to fetch one such asset, and
as far as possible, no users were repeatedly asked to
run the experiment. We did not seek to re-measure the
same user. There was some small possibility of repeated
measurements: we could not constrain re-presentation
of cached state, and some forms of HTML5 embedding
do re-cycle, such as YouTube cached state. Google does
not carry forward the referring site, and APNIC’s web
log does not record where the advertisement was placed,
so it is impossible to be certain that there were no re-
peats, but the number should be small.
In this experiment, those researchers not employed by
APNIC were exposed only to anonymized data.
4. ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the results of the analy-
ses. We will start with “broad brush” simple hypothesis
tests, then focus on those same tests, applied to country,
region, ASN, OS and browser. This will be followed by
a more comprehensive Rasch model, which analyzes the
data as a whole, and finally a generalised linear mixed
model will be applied.
4.1 Standard Statistical Tests
The starting point for this analysis is to apply the
two types of test described above: the Fisher Exact test
of independence/dependence, and McNemar’s Test to
examine the difference between the two measurements.
We applied all tests with a significance level of α =
0.05, applying the appropriate Bonferroni corrections
when conducting a set of multiple tests (i.e., we used
significance α/n for a family of n tests). Note that in
some cases, e.g., when we were testing against ASN,
n was quite large, and so the actual threshold was
very small. Less conservative corrections exist (for in-
Table 3: Number and proportion of correctly completed mea-
surements by OS, and their difference.
Success proportion
OS ID N/105 HTTP HTTPS Difference
1 0.019 0.977 0.847 0.130
2 0.077 0.983 0.917 0.066
3 2.577 0.968 0.881 0.088
4 0.655 0.978 0.903 0.075
5 0.039 0.995 0.989 0.006
6 7.337 0.969 0.881 0.088
7 8.511 0.988 0.891 0.098
8 0.036 0.978 0.873 0.105
9 0.052 0.993 0.825 0.169
10 0.647 0.981 0.881 0.100
11 2.216 0.966 0.884 0.081
12 0.155 0.974 0.820 0.154
13 0.016 0.990 0.819 0.171
14 10.566 0.963 0.909 0.055
Overall 32.903 0.973 0.893 0.080
stance the Sidak or Holm-Bonferroni) but the results
here are conclusive without needing the extra power
gained through these more accurate corrections.
The results for the test applied to the whole dataset
are shown in Table 2. We first see that we must re-
ject the idea that the measurements are independent.
A simple explanation is that if it is it difficult to com-
plete an HTTP connection, it may also be difficult to
complete an HTTPS connection. This is expected for
a matched pair experiment, so the Fisher Exact test is
really just a confirmation.
It is important to note the difference between inde-
pendent observations and independent measurements.
It is reasonable, as a first approximation, to assume that
observations of different users are independent. The
Fisher Exact test above shows that a paired set of mea-
surements are not independent.
The more subtle question that this raises is, given
such dependency, can we really assert that HTTPS is
“harder” than HTTP? The goal of assessing this ques-
tion is addressed by McNemar’s test. The table shows
that we must also reject the null in this case, and hence
we have significant evidence that the two measurements
have different levels of difficulty. The direction can be
seen from the differences in probabilities, e.g., see Ta-
ble 3, and Figure 1.
This finding must be carefully qualified, noting here
that although the two measurements are matched, they
typically occur in order, and hence, there may be some
effect on the second measurement resulting from the
state created by the first. So we must understand that
this experiment concerns lifting a connection up from
HTTP to HTTPS, not an arbitrary HTTPS connection
(see the detailed notes in Section 3).
As well, care must be taken that the results have not
been created by some underlying covariate. As an initial
window into this question, consider the boxplot [29, 30]
shown in Figure 1. The plot shows (shaded) the in-
terquartile range, and as a notch the confidence interval
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Figure 1: Boxplot of difference p
HTTP
− p
HTTPS
by covariate.
Note that the lower quartile is always positive, as are all whiskers
except those for ASN. If covariates had no effect on the result,
these should all have similar interquartile range and median.
for the estimate of the median value, of the difference
p
HTTP
− p
HTTPS
. If the covariates were truly irrele-
vant, we would expect that interquartiles and medians
should be the same (within the ranges of natural vari-
ation shown by the confidence in intervals in the case
of the median), and hence the chart provides evidence
that the covariates are important.
Therefore we now consider what part the covariates
(country, region, ASN, OS and browser) play. We chose,
at least initially, to be conservative by only analyz-
ing groupings with at least 500 measurements. It is
quite possible that smaller groupings would have been
amenable to analysis, but we had no need (here) to de-
scribe the relationships between all of the rarer group-
ings, as our goal was to ascertain whether the overall
result was supported on a finer level of granularity.
The number 500 was chosen through an initial ex-
ploratory analysis, which noted that some of the proba-
bilities in question were quite close to 1, and hence the
typical statistical rules of thumb required a moderately
large number of observations. As we did not know ex-
actly what these probabilities were a priori, we chose
a conservative lower bound. We also found, as Table 4
shows, that excluding the groups with a small number
of observations excluded a small percentage of the data.
As noted above, we worked with anonymized data,
e.g., region codes were remapped. We were not aiming
here for strict anonymization of all details, but aimed to
(i) prevent individual identification without extraordi-
nary efforts, and (ii) ensure that the statistical analyses
were not biased by preconceived notions about different
Internet regions. Limiting the data to groups with at
least 500 measurements also facilitated this blinding.
The results can be seen in Figure 2, which shows his-
tograms of the distributions of p-values over the set of
tests grouped by the various categorical covariates de-
scribed above. The important fact to note is that most
of the p-values are small. We cannot see (at the reso-
lution of the plot) whether the p-values fall below the
threshold, so Table 4 summarizes the tests, and shows
that, in a large proportion of the cases, we rejected the
null-hypotheses. Thus we have significant evidence for
Table 4: Hypothesis tests summaries for different covariates. N˜
is the number of groups left after exluding those with fewer than
500 observations. The % of data is that retained by this filtering.
And the two final columns report the proportion of tests for which
we reject the null hypothesis over these groups for the Fisher and
McNemar tests, respectively.
covariate N˜ % of data Fisher McNemar
country 119 99.6 0.580 0.840
region 20 100.0 0.800 0.950
ASN 458 93.1 0.277 0.555
browser 28 99.9 0.821 0.929
OS 14 100.0 0.929 1.000
these properties in many of the groupings, and as such,
our model should incorporate these features.
Interestingly, ASN is the grouping with the lowest
proportion of rejected null-hypotheses, while we might
have expected that ASN would have a larger effect on
the network aspects of the problem. However, remem-
ber the large Bonferroni correction in this case, which
leads to a rather conservative test.
There is much more work to be done in this area.
Multiple-comparisons could be applied, for instance, to
differentiate regions or some other covariates, in order to
understand which observed differences were significant,
and which were “noise.” However, in doing so there
would be O(n2) comparisons for n regions, and more
importantly, we are then performing a set of hypothesis
tests that are not all independent of each other, com-
plicating the test procedure greatly. Moreover, much of
this theory has been developed in domains where the
conduct of each measurement requires a physical or so-
cial experiment, and therefore large sets of costly mea-
surements. Instead, as our next step, we opt to apply
an approach called Rasch modeling described below.
4.2 Rasch Modeling
The disadvantage of the previous tests is firstly that
they provide only a yes/no answer (or really a yes/maybe
answer), while we would like, for instance, to be able
to say whether a particular country is falling behind
in its ability to support HTTPS. Secondly, this ap-
proach breaks the data into blocks and analyzes each
separately, but there are advantages in analyzing it in
toto.
There are many approaches that could be adopted
to solve this problem. Here, we consider an approach
broadly called Item Response Theory (IRT). This is an
area best illustrated by its application to the analysis
of examinations. In this context, an exam consists of
a list of m questions, performed by n students. At its
simplest, each student answers each question either cor-
rectly, or not, forming a set of binary response variables
Y
(j)
i , where i is the student (in our context an observa-
tion) and j is the question (a measurement).
Within IRT, one of the oldest and most popular strate-
gies is called Rasch modeling [31, 32]. This posits that
there are latent variables, namely:
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(b) McNemar p-values.
Figure 2: The distributions of p-values for the Fisher Exact and McNemar tests, applied across country, region, ASN, browser and OS.
The distributions in all cases vary dramatically from a uniform distribution, with values heavily skewed in the direction of p = 0.
1. the ability or proficiency of student i, denoted αi;
and
2. the difficulty of question j, denoted βj
that determine the probability of a student i answering
question j correctly. The variables are latent in that we
do not know them a priori.
In its simplest case, i.e., a dichotomous response, we
have response variables Y
(j)
i , which are Bernoulli ran-
dom variables indicating a successful answer to a ques-
tion, whose probabilities are modeled as
p
(j)
i = P
{
Y
(j)
i = 1
}
=
exp (αi − βj)
1 + exp (αi − βj)
. (1)
The probability function above is described as logistic,
and has an inverse called the logit function. Taking the
logit we get
logit(p
(j)
i ) = log
(
p
(j)
i /(1− p
(j)
i )
)
= αi − βj . (2)
Thus we have a simple linear relationship at this point.
Rasch modeling is one of the simplest, and yet most
enduring approaches to IRT [31, 32], because it has a
number of appealing properties:
• It simplifies the relationships so that reasonable es-
timates can be made, even though we have only one
instance of each student attempting each question;
• Unlike the conventional statistical paradigm, where
parameters are fit to data, and accepted or rejected
based on the accuracy of the fit, in Rasch modeling
the objective is to obtain “data” that fit the model,
i.e., the latent predictor variables.
• The Rasch model embodies the principle of invariant
comparison, in which (broadly speaking) the effect
on the outcome of a question is separated into the
affect of the respondent, and the question’s difficulty.
The model is not limited to modeling examinations, but
can be applied to any set of observations such as we
have. In the traditional dichotomous Rasch analysis, we
analyze each student who answers questions correctly or
incorrectly, but in our data, we have (i) a large number
of observations, well above that normally considered in
IRT, and (ii) we have no particular interest in the per-
formance of individuals.
To be precise, we could consider each observation as
one “student” participating in the measurements, and
analyze them all separately, but this would be both ba-
nal (since performance at this level of granularity is
immaterial) and needlessly computationally complex.
In practice, we would like to group measurements into
meaningful partitions (a partition is a collection of sub-
sets that are disjoint and cover the original set).
However, when this is done, we depart from the pure
simplicity of the basic Rasch model. There are at least
two alternative approaches; we might think of these sub-
sets as either being comprised of:
1. a group of similar students, who have an underly-
ing property in common (usually we assume mem-
bers of the group have proficiencies that are random
variables with a common mean and variance); or
2. a group of repeated measurements of a “student”
who corresponds to the particular subset, and the
responses are now Binomial random variables cor-
responding to the number of correct measurements
within the subset.
The two assumptions lead naturally to different solution
algorithms.
The first model still follows (2), but now we assume
that αi ∼ N(λk, σ
2), where λk is the group mean pro-
ficiency, and σ2 is the standard deviation within the
group, parameters which we need to estimate.
This approach is perhaps more advanced, in that ex-
act results are known, and there are off-the-shelf solvers
usingMarginal Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MMLE).
We use IRTm [33, 34], a Matlab toolbox allowing quite
general models to be estimated. MMLE also has the dis-
advantage that we assume a model for the distribution
of the grouped student proficiencies.
Moreover, in its model a categorical variable with m
categories is deconstructed intom binary variables, each
an indicator for one possible state of the original vari-
able. This has the advantage of simplifying the model,
but at the expense of greatly increasing the number of
variables. For instance, in our filtered data, we have 119
countries, and so we must construct a covariate vector
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consisting of 119 binary elements. The result is that the
estimation procedure takes more memory and time.
The results are illustrated below, in conjunction with
those of the second approach.
The second approach takes a simpler model, that
logit(p
(j)
i ) = αk − βj . (3)
for i ∈ Gk, where Gk is the kth group. We now only
estimate a group proficiency αk, not individual profi-
ciencies. This has the disadvantage that it might not
be able to fit the data as accurately, but it does free us
from distributional assumptions.
However, the standard Binomial Rasch models for re-
peated measurements assume each measurement is re-
peated a fixed number of times. For instance, in partial-
credit Rasch models [35], a student may obtain some
proportion of the marks for a question, but each stu-
dent answers the same question, with the same total
possible marks. But in our groupings, the number of
“total marks” would vary, depending on the number of
observations that fall into the group. This case does not
appear to have been treated in the literature, and hence
we wrote our own Alternating Least Squares (ALS) al-
gorithm (also in Matlab) to estimate the parameters.
The algorithm alternates between fitting the αk and
the βj values, keeping the alternative parameters fixed.
It also needs an additional fixed point of reference (be-
cause the variables αk and βj are not otherwise uniquely
determined), which we fix without loss of generality, to
be E[αk] = 0.
Ideally, we could group by all covariates at once.
However, this results in few measurements per group,
and a very large number of covariates in the MMLE ap-
proach, while in the ALS approach, we end up with few
observations in many of the bins, due to the combinato-
rial nature of the number of bins. Thus we leave a com-
bined covariate analysis until later, and analyze each of
the categories as separate groupings, as we did in the
statistical tests above. As before, we again made the
highly conservative choice to consider only groupings
with at least 500 measurements, which is also helpful
in refining the number of categories for variables, and
hence reducing the computation load for MMLE.
We assessed the two approaches in this (somewhat
non-standard) application by comparing computation
times, and Root-Mean-Square (RMS) errors, as shown
in Figure 3. All computations were made on an 8 core,
Intel i7-6900K 3.2 GHz, running Linux Mint 18, and
Matlab R1016b. Note that the largest case for the
MMLE algorithm did not complete (within 24 hours),
The ALS algorithm was orders of magnitude more accu-
rate and faster. So in what follows we focus on the ALS
approach. Note also that the estimation errors in ALS
reach a maximum in the order of 5%, which is reason-
able given the problem of interest, but it works better
Table 5: ALS estimates of Rasch “difficulty” parameters with
different groupings. Note the increase in difficulty for HTTPS.
country region browser OS
β
HTTP
-5.26 -4.91 -3.94 -3.99
β
HTTPS
-2.92 -2.74 -2.29 -2.12
Difference 2.34 2.16 1.65 1.86
on the cases with a smaller number of variates, and so
we ignore ASN for the moment.
The first detail to consider is the βj values, indicat-
ing the difficulty in completing the two measurements
(HTTP, and HTTPS). The estimated values are shown
in Table 5, along with their difference, which is an in-
dication of the additional difficulty of the HTTPS mea-
surement. From all points of view, HTTPS is more diffi-
cult than HTTP. The country/region and the browser/OS
covariate groupings also show some consistency, indi-
cating that these variables act on the measurements in
somewhat the same way, which is not surprising.
The second set of parameters to examine are the αi
values, namely, the ability or proficiency of a particular
covariate group to perform the measurement, large val-
ues being better. Figure 4 shows the distribution of αi
values for the region, OS, and browser covariates. We
see that they might be coarsely considered to follow a
Normal distribution. The data by OS fit this assump-
tion least well, but remember that there are only 14
values here, so we do not expect to see a clean fit. We
expect to see some natural variation here, because of es-
timation error, and measurement noise. The excluded
case, the data by ASN, present a much wider range of
variation than the cases shown, and we hypothesize that
this variability is real, and important, but defer finaliz-
ing this conclusion.
We also see outliers, here defined as those values that
fall more than 1.96 times the standard deviation from
the mean, i.e., outside the 95th percentiles. These are
not extreme outliers, but these cases certainly warrant
further investigation. There are outliers on the positive
side: five countries, one browser, and one OS, each of
which found the measurements easier to correctly per-
form. These are of no particular concern, though it
might be interesting to investigate them further, to un-
derstand if their success could be duplicated. On the
downside, there is only one outlier country.
There are two main conclusions to be drawn.
1. The measurements show that there is significantly
more difficulty in performing HTTPS than HTTP
measurements. The difference is often small, necessi-
tating some extra care in order to determine whether
the difference is significant.
2. There are country, OS, and browser differences, mainly
important through a small set that exhibits more ex-
treme variations from the norm.
Regarding the latter conclusion, we have deliberately
kept the blinding in our analysis here. Even though it
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Figure 3: RMS errors and computation times for the two approaches to Rasch modeling.
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Figure 4: Histograms of αk values for ALS algorithm, omitting
ASN, as this shows a less clear distribution.
is not necessary, and for operational tasks such as im-
proving the current situation, an organization could use
the same analysis to focus efforts on improvements. It is
not within the ambit of this paper to make statements
for or against particular regions, browsers or OSes.
This analysis has one major limitation — we consid-
ered the different groupings separately, instead of to-
gether. Moreover, we wish to perform our investiga-
tions of outliers in more detail (particularly for ASN),
and explore how components interact, e.g., in the above
analysis we tended to highlight countries that performed
badly in both tests, not just HTTPS.
4.3 Generalized Linear Mixed Models
The above approach is appealing in its simplicity, but
deeper analysis is possible. For instance, analysis of
ASN proved problematic in the above tests and analy-
sis, at least in part because there are many more ASNs
than any of the other categories. Another statistical
tool is a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) [36]. This is
a natural generalization of linear modeling to cope with
non-Gaussian random variables (in our case, we have
Bernoulli (0/1) random variables).
This has the potential to be applied to a wide variety
of analyses, but it requires refinement to the specifics of
the problem of interest, and we must also be able to per-
form the computations, which will be more challenging
than those of the previous tests.
In some ways, the idea of a GLM is similar to that of
Rasch. We model the probability of success via an in-
verse link function to a linear combination of predictors.
For Bernoulli data, we would (as in the Rasch model)
use the logit link function. However, there is a subtle
difference in the sense that in Rasch modeling, we think
of each student having a probability of success. Instead,
we now think of a generic Bernoulli response variable
Y (j) ∼ Bernoulli(p(j)), for which we have observations,
but now the probability of success is a function of some
set of predictors, i.e.,
logit
(
p(j)
)
= β0 +
K∑
k=1
βkX
(k), (4)
where Y (j) is the response we are interested in — here
it will be Y HTTPS , and the βk are K parameters to
be estimated, linking the outcome to the predictor as a
so-called fixed effect.
The predictors X(k) could include the covariates al-
ready discussed (country, region, ASN, browser and
OS), but note that as in the MMLE Rasch analysis,
categorical predictors such as region, with n possible
values, must be converted into a binary vector of length
n, indicating which category applies. This leads us to
the problem of estimating a potentially large number of
parameters βk. The predictors could also include our
previous test result Y HTTP .
At least initially, the particular effect of each coun-
try is not material. Our initial concern is to remove
confounding effects of the country from the analysis, so
that the questions of interest can be answered. If this
is the case, we can instead include a covariate as a ran-
dom effect, leading to the idea of a Generalized Linear
MixedModel (GLMM), incorporating a mixture of fixed
and random effects. In this formulation, we might take
random intercepts um and then
logit
(
p(j)m
)
= β0 +
K∑
k=1
βkX
(k) + um, (5)
where we now estimate different probabilities for each
country m, with a random-effect uk (which is a change
to the intercept). We could add similar random effects
for the other covariates. The key difference here between
the fixed-effect parameters βk and the random-effects
parameters um are that we assume little about the fixed-
effect parameters, whereas the um are assumed to come
from a Normal distribution, i.e., um ∼ N(0, σ
2), whose
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variance σ2 is a parameter to be estimated here. This
assumption allows for estimation despite the potentially
large number of values um, because the model needs
only the overall variance estimate, not the individual
parameters. Or, to be more clear, if we were to make
predictions from this model, we would not retain the
individual um values, but only the variance σ
2.
Random effects are used particularly when we have
a predictor or covariate that is not repeatable. For
instance, in examinations, we would not test students
using the same questions twice. Here, the countries ob-
served are formed through the sampling process, and so
the number of observations per country is not set by
the experimenters. We cannot repeat exactly the same
experiment at that level, so it is reasonable to include
these covariates as random effects. However, we might
want to change that decision if we were asking a partic-
ular question about the impact of a particular country
on the results, when it would be appropriate to include
a predictor for that particular country as a fixed effect.
For instance, we could ask the question “Is country X
being left behind, taking into account the effects of all of
the other covariates?” Including the other covariates as
random effects avoids the problem that we might believe
country X is being left behind, even though the result
arises because country X has a preponderance of users
on OS Y, which is the real cause.
Another advantage of random effects is that they lead
to relatively more efficient algorithms for estimation, be-
cause we only have to estimate one parameter instead
of one per category. Here, we focus on the analysis us-
ing Y HTTP as the only fixed effect, and consider which
covariates are important to include in any model. That
is, we use the analysis technique to explore whether we
should incorporate region, for instance, into our model.
There is a close connection between Rasch models and
GLMM [37]. In fact, the GLMM might be thought of as
a type of generalized Rasch model where the groupings
considered above are all potentially considered at once
as random effects.
Here we perform a Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(MLE) of the parameters of these models using R [38],
and the lme4 [39] package.
We do not consider arbitrary problems combining all
factors at once, due to the long computational times
required for these cases. Moreover, some factors are
“nested” inside others, e.g., countries in regions, and to
a lesser extent, browsers in OS. This creates additional
complexity in modeling this structure in the regression.
We will start by considering the simple problems, in-
cluding one covariate as a random effect at a time.
Note also that in this section of the analysis, com-
putational requirements limit us to considering an sub-
sample of our data. The algorithms involved are very
much more computationally complex, so for the moment
Table 6: Model selection. Covariates included in a model are
indicated by their first letter. Selections are indicated in bold.
Note that times for more complex models are the time taken to
update the model from the next simpler model.
Covariates AIC BIC time (s)
- 212244.1 212265.5 0.7
C 202988.5 203020.5 34.0
R 206266.5 206298.5 26.5
A 191988.6 192020.7 90.1
B 210905.8 210937.8 28.5
O 211560.8 211592.9 28.7
A,C 191657.5 191700.2 153.0
A,R 191986.5 192029.2 253.5
A,B 190974.9 191017.6 166.1
A,O 191424.6 191467.3 174.7
A,B,C 190554.3 190607.7 493.2
A,B,R 190922.2 190975.6 246.4
A,B,O 190729.5 190782.9 304.2
A,B,C,R 190553.5 190617.5 384.9
A,B,C,O 190187.1 190251.2 397.3
A,B,C,O,R 190178.3 190253.0 574.9
we sub-sample 10% (randomly without replacement) of
our original set. However, we no longer restrict our at-
tention to groupings with over 500 observations.
The particular model we consider first is
logit
(
pHTTPSm
)
= β0 + β1Y
HTTP
i + um (6)
where observation i ∈ Gm, i.e., the observation falls into
group m of a particular covariate, included through a
random intercept uk, and the fixed effect is the influence
that the 1st measurement has on the 2nd (the result).
Here β1 captures the marginal increase in the chance of
success in the second measurement, given the first.
Apart from considering the question of quantitatively
inferring the effect of the first measurement on the sec-
ond (we already know from our Fisher test that there
is typically some effect, but not how much), we will
also use this approach to assess which covariates are
necessary in our modeling enterprise. We will do so
using Information Criteria (IC), specifically Akaike IC
(AIC) [40] and Bayesian IC (BIC) [41].
These criteria allow one to determine an appropri-
ate trade-off between the accuracy usually obtained by
including additional parameters into a model, against
the costs of addition parameters, particular in the re-
duction of generality of the model, i.e., the dangers of
over-fitting. In general, models with a lower IC are pre-
ferred, though there is no single perfect IC [42], and so
two are used here to confirm conclusions.
We adopt a greedy approach to inclusion of covari-
ates: we start by considering the benefit of including a
single covariate, and we choose the one that decreases
the IC by the largest amount. We then consider the
benefit of including a second covariate and so on. An
advantage this grants is that we can update an exist-
ing model, adding in extra covariates instead of starting
from scratch, saving additional computation time.
Table 6 shows the process, where we have first com-
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Table 7: GLMM estimated parameters of the full dataset, for
model (A,B,C,O) including random effects of ASN, browser,
country and OS. Note that standard error and p-values are not
calculated for the σ values.
Parameter value std. error p-value
β0 2.7960 0.0214 < 2× 10−16
β1 1.7236 0.0068 < 2× 10−16
σASN 2.0971 - -
σbrowser 1.3177 - -
σcountry 0.7944 - -
σOS 0.4181 - -
puted the GLM with only the fixed effect, then updated
this model to include one other covariate. Of the possi-
bilities, ASN realises the largest reduction in both ICs,
and so we add this into our model.
We then update by adding a second covariate, the
winning case being browser, i.e., the case listed as model
(A,B). In the following steps the winners are country
and OS. Note that the selected covariates (see boldface
entries) present a decreasing sequence of ICs.
However, when we consider including region, we see
that the IC do not both decrease (specifically BIC indi-
cated in red increases), and hence we will not add this
addition covariate. This is slightly conservative, but the
marginal improvement is at best very small.
The conclusion is that the alternative covariates add
little additional information. This is somewhat obvious:
once we know the country, we know the region. How-
ever, the process above (i) confirms that all of the other
covariates should be included, and (ii) confirms that we
prefer country over region as a explanatory covariate.
Once we have a model, we can examine it in detail.
For the final model (A,B,C,O), we rerun the estimation
procedure for the full dataset. The total analysis took
1.5 hours. Table 7 shows the results.
The small p-values for the fixed effects indicate a high
degree of significance. As we expect, the result of the
first measurement is related to that of the second. The
positive value of β1 indicates that success in the first
measurement improves our chance in the second.
The σk values show the variance of the random ef-
fect parameters for each type of covariate. As might be
expected, they are decreasing because the are listed in
order of importance as measured by the IC.
Also noteworthy is the scale of the effects. The σk
give a measure of the variability of the random effect
associated with the covariate. It could be considered
against the scale of β1, which tells the marginal increase
resulting from success in the first measurement. We can
see that the variability of effects due to ASN are of a
similar magnitude to β1, and the affect due to country
is not far behind. Effects due to browser and OS are
somewhat smaller.
In any statistical analysis, care must be exercised
when asserting causality. Just because two events are
correlated, we cannot assert causality. However, the
GLMM presented has the advantage that it can provide
predictions. That is, we could use this model to predict
the outcome of our experiment in the future, based on
the various covariates, and hence provide some insights
through this means.
One last important insight is that the dependence on
the covariates indicates that the results are not an arte-
fact of APNIC’s measurement infrastructure, as that
would remove dependency on point of origin effects.
GLMMs have great capabilities, and we have only
scratched the surface here. We could consider cross-
variable effects, hierarchical models, and so on, and use
this to build more focused experiments to understand,
for instance, the details of how some HTTPS connec-
tions fail, in order to improve the situation.
5. CONCLUSION AND FURTHERWORK
Using a large set of measurements, and detailed sta-
tistical modeling we have shown that a small cohort
of users in the real world will be adversely affected if
HTTPS is adopted universally. That cohort is not a
large proportion of Internet users, but those users de-
serve our attention: What are we going to do, to provide
them with a secure network?
We have categorized measurements by country and
region, their provider (origin ASN), browser and oper-
ating system, and shown that all of these factors affect a
client’s facility with HTTPS. The range of factors points
to a range of causes for the blockages. The browser/OS
combination suggests a technological problem, but the
other covariates suggest problems based in the network
near the clients.
In the future, we plan to further investigate, and use
the details of the analysis to help focus efforts onto rel-
evant development to mitigate the problem. We also
aim to repeat this study to consider the rate of change
in this cohort of users, to understand if this problem is
growing, or shrinking over time.
The use of careful statistical methods was vital in
this study. The underlying signal is weak, and hence
required “amplification” and careful analysis so as to
be able to make confident statements.
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